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On November 19, 2001, a case of inhalational anthrax was identified in a 94-year-old Connecticut woman,
who later died. We conducted intensive surveillance for additional anthrax cases, which included collecting
data from hospitals, emergency departments, private practitioners, death certificates, postal facilities, vet-
erinarians, and the state medical examiner. No additional cases of anthrax were identified. The absence of
additional anthrax cases argued against an intentional environmental release of Bacillus anthracis in Con-
necticut and suggested that, if the source of anthrax had been cross-contaminated mail, the risk for
anthrax in this setting was very low. This surveillance system provides a model that can be adapted for use
in similar emergency settings.
n response to the World Trade Center attack on September
11, 2001, the Connecticut Department of Public Health,
assisted by all Connecticut hospitals, implemented a syndro-
mic surveillance system that monitored admissions to acute-
care hospitals and visits to emergency departments to detect
any concurrent bioterrorism event. All hospitals and emer-
gency departments were asked to report six categories of
admissions: respiratory conditions of any type, pneumonia,
meningitis or encephalitis, paralysis or paresis of nontraumatic
origin, clusters of unusual illness, and total admissions on a
daily basis.
After the first confirmed inhalational anthrax case on
October 4 (1), the surveillance system was modified to detect
the early phase of any disease outbreak that might occur as a
result of mass exposure to biological agents—bacteria,
viruses, or toxins—used for terrorism. Seven additional hospi-
tal admission categories were included in the surveillance sys-
tem: hemoptysis, acute respiratory distress syndrome or
respiratory failure of uncertain origin, sepsis or nontraumatic
shock, fever and rash, fever of unknown origin, gastrointesti-
nal symptoms (vomiting, diarrhea, and dehydration), and skin
infections. 
On November 20, 2001, the 11th known case of bioterror-
ism-related inhalational anthrax since October 4 was identified
in a 94-year-old resident of Oxford, Connecticut, a rural com-
munity of <10,000 persons. Unlike most recent patients with
bioterrorism-associated anthrax, this patient was not a media
or postal worker (1–4). A team of public health investigators
from the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention was
invited by the state of Connecticut to work in collaboration
with state and local health officials to conduct an epidemio-
logic investigation.
After the death of the index patient on November 21,
ongoing statewide surveillance for bioterrorism-related dis-
ease was expanded to meet two objectives: 1) conduct retro-
spective surveillance to identify any previously undetected
cases of anthrax since September 1, 2001, that might provide
clues to the source of exposure and to assess the possibility of
intentional environmental release of Bacillus anthracis and 2)
conduct prospective surveillance to detect early cases of
anthrax that might occur and ensure rapid detection and treat-
ment. The surveillance activities that occurred during this epi-
demiologic investigation are described.
Methods
Surveillance Activities
Because the first identified case of bioterrorism-related
human anthrax in the United States (1) had a presumed source
of exposure in mid-September 2001, retrospective surveillance
focused on the period from September 1 to November 30,
2001. Methods included reviewing death certificates, labora-
tory data, medical examiner’s records, and postal worker
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absentee records to find evidence of illness in the general pop-
ulation and conducting a veterinary survey to seek evidence in
animal populations. Prospective surveillance focused on the
period beginning November 21, 2001, and included hospital
admissions, emergency department visits, and private physi-
cian reports. After retrospective surveillance was completed,
we also initiated prospective surveillance of medical examiner
and postal worker absentee records.
Case Definitions
We defined a confirmed case of anthrax as clinically com-
patible illness in a person with laboratory confirmation by iso-
lation of B. anthracis from a clinical specimen or other
laboratory evidence of B. anthracis infection based on at least
two supportive laboratory tests (e.g., polymerase chain reac-
tion or serologic or immunohistochemical testing). We defined
a suspected case as a clinically compatible case of illness with-
out isolation of B. anthracis and no alternative diagnosis, but
with laboratory evidence of B. anthracis by one supportive
laboratory test; or a clinically compatible case of anthrax
linked by epidemiologic methods to a confirmed environmen-
tal exposure but without corroborative laboratory evidence of
infection. Illnesses that were investigated and failed to fulfill
criteria for the above case definitions were classified as “no
apparent anthrax disease.”
Retrospective Surveillance
Death Certificates
All death certificates for persons who died in Connecticut
from September 1 to November 30 were reviewed to ascertain
if any deaths could be potentially associated with anthrax.
Because of the central role of contaminated letters in previous
anthrax cases, surveillance focused on deaths occurring in
Oxford, where the patient lived, and the eight surrounding
towns (Ansonia, Beacon Falls, Derby, Naugatuck, Seymour,
Shelton, Southbury, and Woodbury [total population 152,481])
served by the same postal processing and distribution center in
Wallingford, Connecticut. This facility received mail from
postal distribution facilities known to be contaminated by B.
anthracis spores, including the postal center in Hamilton, New
Jersey, where the envelopes containing B. anthracis sent to
two U.S. senators originated. 
Death certificates with the following conditions listed as
the immediate or underlying cause of death were selected for
further review: pneumonia, sepsis, cardiac arrest without
cause, respiratory arrest without cause, sudden death, and
undetermined cause. Deaths were further classified by place of
occurrence: hospital, nursing home, residence, or other setting.
Because of the paucity of clinical information on deaths occur-
ring outside hospitals, the review focused on in-hospital
deaths. 
To obtain additional information on in-hospital deaths, lab-
oratories, infection control practitioners, and physicians were
contacted by telephone to identify patients for whom a defini-
tive cause of death could be determined. For the remaining
deaths in which cause of death could not be ascertained, medi-
cal record reviews by a team of four physician epidemiologists
using a standardized abstraction form were conducted at the
hospitals where the deaths occurred.
Laboratory Data
Hospital-associated laboratories statewide were contacted
to obtain information on any gram-positive rods or Bacillus
species isolated from sterile sites (e.g., blood, cerebrospinal
fluid, or pleural fluid). A standardized reporting form was pro-
vided to laboratories to be completed and sent to a 24-hour–
accessible fax machine. For Bacillus species isolates, we con-
tacted laboratories by phone to gather information about motil-
ity and hemolysis tests when this information was not
provided on the report. For all other reports of gram-positive
bacilli, laboratories were contacted to obtain speciation infor-
mation if available, when this information was not provided.
All available isolates suspicious for B. anthracis were sent to
the Connecticut Department of Public Health (CDPH) labora-
tory for final identification. 
Medical Examiner’s Records
Connecticut’s state medical examiner is notified of deaths
that occur outside hospitals or within 24 hours of hospitaliza-
tion. Data on deaths referred to the medical examiner and
reported from September 1 to November 26 were reviewed.
After November 26, ongoing prospective surveillance for
deaths referred to the medical examiner was assumed by
CDPH, with a particular focus on deaths in the town where the
index patient resided and the eight surrounding towns. The
medical examiner’s office and CDPH made the decision about
whether an autopsy was necessary to exclude anthrax as the
cause of death, based on the symptoms of the deceased patient
and the clinical circumstances surrounding death.
Postal Worker Absenteeism
Work attendance records were obtained from both the local
postal and main processing distribution facilities serving the
index patient’s town of residence and the eight surrounding
towns (Seymour and Wallingford postal facilities). To obtain
information about reasons for absence, either postal manage-
ment or CDPH personnel interviewed postal workers with
absences for >3 consecutive days from September 11 to
November 25, 2001. When workers were not available to be
interviewed, information was obtained by interviewing man-
agement personnel, who also were questioned about recent
deaths in postal workers. 
Surveillance for Postal Worker 
Influenzalike Illness and Cutaneous Conditions
The U.S. Postal Service had been conducting surveillance
for influenzalike illness or cutaneous conditions compatible
with anthrax among postal workers nationwide since October
25, 2001. In Connecticut, postal service management collectedBIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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data from postal workers and reported to the postal medical
office in Hartford, Connecticut. Reports from employees were
voluntary. Data for the state were submitted to area headquar-
ters (serving New England and parts of New York) daily and
then reported to national postal headquarters in Washington,
D.C. For cases in which the postal worker was hospitalized
with influenzalike symptoms, national headquarters was noti-
fied directly. Beginning November 6, only hospitalizations
were reported to area headquarters; however, data for the state
of Connecticut were still collected in Hartford. All past reports
to the system and ongoing reports were reviewed to character-
ize the symptoms and signs; for conditions suspicious for
anthrax, health-care providers were called for further clinical
information.
Prospective Surveillance
Hospital, Emergency Departments, and Physician Reports
The statewide hospital-based surveillance for bioterrorism-
related agents that began after September 11, 2001, was
enhanced from November 27 to December 15. All acute-care
hospitals in Connecticut designated a surveillance officer (e.g.,
infection control practitioner, nurse, or physician) who would
be responsible for surveillance of conditions potentially
related to anthrax and other bioterrorism-related agents at their
institution. Each day, the surveillance officer contacted the
clinical microbiology laboratory to request a list of any suspect
Gram stain results or bacterial isolates from sterile sites. Sus-
pect results were defined as gram-positive rods that had not
been further identified or Bacillus species that had not been
further typed or for which speciation as B. anthracis had not
been excluded. Additionally, the surveillance officer reviewed
admissions for the previous 24 h and reported patients having
any one of five clinical syndromes (acute respiratory failure
with pleural effusion; hemorrhagic enteritis with fever; a skin
lesion characterized by vesicles, ulcer, or eschar; meningitis,
encephalitis, or unexplained acute encephalopathy; or anthrax
or suspected anthrax infection) and a widened mediastinum on
chest radiograph or laboratory findings of a gram-positive
bacillus on Gram stain, Bacillus species from culture of a ster-
ile site specimen, or hemorrhagic cerebrospinal fluid, pleural,
or peritoneal fluid in patients without a traumatic tap or event. 
Using a standardized form, the surveillance officer
reported findings daily to CDPH. Upon identifying patients
with the surveillance criteria for a suspect anthrax case, hospi-
tal surveillance officers contacted a designated member of the
surveillance team by telephone and faxed the report. These
patients were then referred to a clinical team for further evalu-
ation. In addition, physicians and infection control practitio-
ners statewide (in particular those in the nine towns including
and surrounding the town of the index patient) were asked to
report immediately to CDPH any patient with symptoms that
suggested anthrax. 
Other Anthrax Surveillance Activities
Survey of Veterinary Practices
To ascertain undiagnosed animal anthrax cases, a one-page
questionnaire was distributed to the members of the Connecti-
cut Veterinary Medical Association (CVMA) on November
28. CVMA has a total of 620 members, accounting for 82% of
the 768 CDPH-licensed veterinarians in Connecticut. Informa-
tion collected included the number of veterinarians associated
with the practice, type of practice, number of undiagnosed
deaths by animal species, animal deaths accompanied by clini-
cal signs consistent with anthrax, and knowledge of confirmed
cases of animal anthrax in Connecticut. Questionnaires were
sent by the CVMA rapid fax system to the approximately 325
members who requested faxed updates from CDPH. We
requested a single completed questionnaire from each practice.
Since some practices included veterinarians who are not
CVMA members, the survey likely reached more veterinarians
than actual members who had requested faxed updates.
Results 
Data were entered and analyzed in an Epi Info database
(5). Hospital, emergency department, and physician reports
were evaluated at least twice a day.
Among the 487 deaths reported from the nine towns in
September, October, and November 2001, a total of 131 (26.9
%) had one of the six conditions under surveillance. Of these,
66 (50.3%) occurred in hospitals; the rest occurred in resi-
dences, nursing homes, and other settings. No postmortem
examinations were performed. By contacting physicians,
infection control practitioners, and laboratories, a likely cause
of death other than anthrax was identified for 7 (10.6%)
patients. For the remaining 59 (89.4%) patients, medical
record review was necessary. In 33 (55.9%), a cause of death
other than anthrax was identified. For 12 (20.3%) patients, the
cause of death was not apparent, but available information on
the clinical features and clinical course (such as absence of
fever and respiratory symptoms) of the patients did not suggest
a diagnosis of anthrax. Insufficient data were available to
assess the cause of death for 14 (23.7%) patients because death
occurred before or shortly after arrival to the hospital. None of
these patients had been autopsied, and because of the lack of a
clear indication and the limited availability of resources, no
further measures (e.g., exhuming the body to conduct autopsy)
were taken to ascertain the cause of death. 
Laboratory Data
Thirty (96.7%) of 31 clinical laboratories provided data.
Twenty-two (73.3%) laboratories reported at least one patient
with a gram-positive bacillus or Bacillus species isolate.
Gram-positive bacilli were identified in 71 specimens from 70
patients (one patient had more than one specimen submitted),
including blood (59 specimens), tissue (6 specimens), perito-Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1081
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neal fluid (3 specimens), pleural fluid (2 specimens), and 1
surgical site specimen. Of patients with gram-positive bacilli,
49 had Bacillus species isolated; none of these was identified
as B. anthracis. For the remaining 22 reports of gram-positive
bacilli, 16 were identified as Corynebacterium, 1 as Proprion-
obacterium, 1 as Clostridium, 1 as Eubacterium, and 1 as Sta-
phylococcus hominis; 1 was a mixed infection with gram-
positive organisms, and 1 was an unidentified motile gram-
variable bacillus.
Medical Examiner’s Records
One hundred forty-eight deaths were reported to the medi-
cal examiner. Of these, autopsies were performed on 14
(9.4%) patients. Cause of death was determined to be an acci-
dent in six, cardiac disease in four, suicide in three, and inhala-
tional anthrax in one (the index patient). Because of the lack of
clinical information on the remaining patients who had not
been autopsied, further review was not possible. 
Postal Worker Absenteeism
At the local postal facility in Seymour, no employees died
during the surveillance period. Two persons were absent for >3
days, one for a scheduled surgery and the other for an injury.
At the main processing and distribution center in Wallingford,
two recent postal worker deaths were attributed to cardiovas-
cular disease; both occurred before September 11, 2001.
Approximately 35 employees were absent for >3 consecutive
days. Interviews of the postal workers about the reasons for
absence showed no apparent anthrax in any workers.
Postal Worker Influenzalike Illness 
and Cutaneous Lesion Surveillance
Ninety-two reports of influenzalike illness were reviewed.
For seven patients with characteristics that might have been
compatible with anthrax (e.g., cutaneous lesions, influenzalike
illness with absence of rhinorrhea, and shortness of breath),
further clinical information was obtained. All cases were clas-
sified as “no apparent anthrax disease” after review.
Prospective Surveillance
Hospital, Emergency Departments, and Physician Reports
Of 59 reports received, all were classified as “no apparent
anthrax disease.” Specimens from 14 patients were sent to
CDC, including 15 serum specimens, 14 skin biopsy speci-
mens, 3 lung biopsies, 2 samples of pleural fluid, 11 samples
of whole blood for polymerase chain reaction, and (from one
patient) autopsy specimens from the gastrointestinal tract,
liver, a lymph node, and one mixed tissue specimen.
Other Anthrax Surveillance Activities
Survey of Veterinary Practices
A total of 140 questionnaires were returned from 140 prac-
tices, representing 365 veterinarians and 48% of licensed Con-
necticut veterinarians. Completed questionnaires were
received from practices distributed throughout eight counties
of the state. Of these, 113 (81%) were small animal practices;
14 (10%) a mixture of small animals, equine, and food animal
practices; and 12 (9%) equine practices. Of the respondents,
69 practices with 180 veterinarians, including nine practices
and 20 livestock veterinarians, were located in the two coun-
ties representing the nine towns of interest during surveillance.
Of the 140 practices, 18 (13%) reported that they were aware
of undiagnosed animal deaths since September 15, 2001. None
of the respondents indicated that they or anyone in their prac-
tice knew of a confirmed case of animal anthrax in Connecti-
cut.   
Discussion
Despite intensive, active prospective and retrospective sur-
veillance, we did not identify any patients other than the index
case with features compatible with anthrax. This finding indi-
cates that the index patient was probably not exposed through
intentional local environmental release of B. anthracis; there-
fore, the concurrent epidemiologic investigation focused on
the personal activities and contacts of the patient. Our find-
ings, in conjunction with the B. anthracis contamination of the
regional postal distribution facility, suggest that the index
patient was likely exposed through cross-contaminated mail. If
so, the lack of additional anthrax cases among persons who
received mail from the same postal facility as the index patient
also suggests that the risk from cross-contaminated mail in this
setting was very low.
The scope of this epidemiologic investigation did not
include a formal evaluation of the surveillance system.
Although a standard for evaluating the performance of a sys-
tem to detect covert acts of bioterrorism has not yet been
described, we have some general comments about the tradi-
tional criteria (6) used in assessing the attributes of surveil-
lance systems. Our system was complex and labor-intensive,
requiring an estimated 1,500 person-hours for state and federal
public health officials alone during the most intense 3-week
period of the investigation. However, the system operated
effectively. The acceptance of the system and compliance in
reporting were likely enhanced by both national and local
events—the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, the
subsequent anthrax–tainted mailings, and the death of the
Connecticut resident from anthrax. The staff at the public
health department were highly motivated, and training require-
ments were minimal because of their knowledge of the preex-
isting system for syndromic surveillance. Use of existing
resources provided a foundation for successfully implement-
ing enhanced surveillance in less than 12 hours. Because of
standardized and relatively simple reporting forms and data
abstraction by trained investigators, quality of the data was
excellent. The system was by design flexible and met evolving
needs, including adding new syndromes to the surveillance
system and moving staff from one activity to another as
needed. Centralized reporting by fax or telephone assisted usBIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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in identifying early any problems in implementation of the sur-
veillance system.
The true frequency of reportable syndromes was not
known before we implemented this surveillance system for
bioterrorism-related agents. Furthermore, with no prior knowl-
edge of bioterrorism events, adequate numerator for the occur-
rence of any bioterrorism-related syndrome, or denominator
for the population susceptible to the event, calculating the sen-
sitivity and predictive value positive for the system was diffi-
cult. However, this system likely reflected accurately the lack
of additional anthrax cases in both animal and human popula-
tions in Connecticut. Approximately 80% of Connecticut-
licensed veterinarians in the state were successfully surveyed,
including veterinarians who treat livestock most susceptible to
anthrax infection, and none reported any animal illness consis-
tent with anthrax. Similarly, an exhaustive search for human
anthrax cases based on review of clinical and laboratory data
yielded no additional cases.
In general, we received timely data that ensured quick and
appropriate public health responses and allowed modifications
to the system as needed. For hospital reporting, most reports
were transmitted to a designated fax by noon each day for
events during the preceding day. This plan was not problem-
atic except on weekends, when hospitals were often operating
with minimal staff. Without exception, all hospitals submitted
data no later than 4 p.m. on the day of required reporting. Fre-
quently, hospital, laboratory, medical examiner, and postal ser-
vice personnel contacted a member of the team by telephone
or pager with concerns about potential patients with suspect
symptoms. The Connecticut Vital Records Department
directed the daily transmission of all death certificates from
the towns of interest, which allowed for continual monitoring
of suspected deaths that required further investigation. The
surveillance system operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
surveillance team members were always available. This con-
stant accessibility was helpful with data turnaround and evalu-
ation of suspect cases but difficult to sustain and resource
intensive. Although surveillance instruments evolved over
time, these changes did not detract from the ability to collect,
manage, and disseminate the data, attesting to the stability of
the system.
Our surveillance activities met the objectives of providing
information about the source of exposure for the index case
and guiding the course of the accompanying epidemiologic
investigation. Although we were able to approach “real-time”
reporting, permanent sustainability of these activities is unreal-
istic because they require too many resources. While the costs
of sustaining this system were not directly evaluated, such an
analysis would be useful. Explicit discussion of costs and ben-
efits may help both in terms of protecting and increasing fund-
ing levels and assuring that existing surveillance systems are
necessary and make the best possible use of limited resources.
In situations requiring surveillance, an approach similar to
ours could be applied after suitable modifications to meet the
need for short periods of time. Clearly, the approaches to
detecting sentinel bioterrorism events require further evalua-
tion, standardization, and improvements to allow a timely, effi-
cient, and effective public health response.
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